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Abstract
In this paper, we consider ﬁscal competition between jurisdictions. Capital taxes
are used to ﬁnance a public input and two public goods, one which beneﬁts mobile
skilled workers and one which beneﬁts immobile unskilled workers. We derive the
jurisdictions’ reaction functions for diﬀerent spending categories. We then estimate
these reaction functions using data from German communities. Thereby we explicitly
allow for a spatially lagged dependent variable and a possible spatial error depen-
dence by applying a generalized spatial tow-stage least squares (GS2SLS) procedure.
The results show, that there is signiﬁcant interaction between spending of neighbour-
ing counties in Germany.
JEL classiﬁcation: H77, J24, J61.
Keywords: Tax competition, capital skill complementarity, public spending, spatial
econometrics.




The early literature on ﬁscal competition claimed that competition for mobile factors would
drive down taxes to ineﬃciently low levels (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). While the
basic model has been extended in various ways (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey), the one
we focus on here is the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition on the composition of spending. Keen
and Marchand (1997) found that jurisdictions will spend too much on public infrastructure,
which attracts mobile capital, and too little on consumption goods, which beneﬁt immobile
workers. We will use a similar model and also look at jurisdictions’ choices of diﬀerent
spending categories under ﬁscal competition.
The early literature also assumed that jurisdictions are so small that they treat the
net return to mobile capital as given. The basic models have been extended to allow for
strategic interaction among communities (Wildasin, 1988). Strategic interaction among
jurisdiction has also provided the basis for most of the empirical work on ﬁscal competition
(see Brueckner, 2003, for a survey). The empirical papers estimate reaction functions,
where, for instance, one jurisdiction’s property tax rate is related to the tax rates of
neighboring jurisdictions.
This paper extends the literature on ﬁscal competition in two ways. First, we incor-
porate two types of labor: skilled and unskilled. In addition we assume that skilled labor
is mobile while unskilled labor is not, and that capital and skilled labor are complements.
This is referred to as capital skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969).1 Second, we allow
for three public goods: a public input, and two public consumption goods, one beneﬁt-
ing skilled labor and the other beneﬁting unskilled labor. Borck (2005) uses this type of
model to study the composition of public spending in a model with small jurisdictions.
By contrast, in this paper we focus on strategic interaction. We also focus on the positive
implications of the theory rather than the welfare implications of ﬁscal competition. The
paper models jurisdictions’ decisions on the diﬀerent types of spending and derives their
reaction functions. We then estimate reaction functions for German communities using
spatial regression techniques.
We believe that these extensions are signiﬁcant for two reasons. First, on the empirical
side, neglecting the interaction between diﬀerent spending categories may blur the mecha-
1Strictly speaking, CSC holds if the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled workers is
smaller than that between capital and unskilled workers.
2nisms by which communities try to attract mobile factors and by which they interact with
neighboring communities. Second, as far as the modelling side and its policy implications
are concerned, we would stress that capital skill complementarity and the greater mobility
of skilled than unskilled workers seem to be well documented. 2 Hence, jurisdictions may
ﬁnd that to attract capital, they also need to attract skilled workers, and to do so they
may also use public goods which diﬀerentially beneﬁt this group of workers.
Within this framework, we proceed as follows. In section 2, we present our model
and derive the jurisdictions’ reaction functions, where the diﬀerent spending categories
are related to spending of the other jurisdictions. In section 3, we describe our empirical
framework for estimating the reaction functions. Section 4 describes our dataset and the
results of our spatial regressions are presented in section 5. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Our model is based on Keen and Marchand (1997) who used Zodrow and Mieszkowski’s
(1986) basic model to study the composition of spending under ﬁscal competition.
There are 2 jurisdictions, called regions, each with independent taxing and spending
power.3 Similar to Huber (1999), we assume that there are four factors of production:
capital K, skilled labor (or human capital), H, unskilled labor, L, and a public input,
P. In each region, output is produced with the same production function, F(K,P,H,L),
which is factor-augmenting, i.e., homogeneous of degree one in private inputs. Assume that
capital and skilled labor are mobile while unskilled labor is immobile. Furthermore, the
mass of unskilled workers in each jurisdiction is normalized to one, as is the mass of initial
skilled workers (before migration) and the capital endowment in each jurisdiction. Denoting
partial derivatives by subscripts, the production function can be written in intensive form
as f(k,p,h) ≡ F (K,P,H,1), with fk,fh,fp > 0,fkk,fhh,fpp < 0. The unskilled wage
rate is R ≡ f(k,p,h) − kfk(k,p,h) − hfh(k,p,h). We assume that there is capital skill
complementarity (CSC) in the sense that fkh > 0. In addition, we assume that public
2See e.g. Griliches (1969), Bergstr¨ om and Panas (1992), and Krusell et al. (2000) for evidence on CSC.
For evidence on the mobility of skilled versus unskilled workers, see Mauro and Spilimbergo (1999), Hunt
(2000) and Giannetti (2001).
3In the empirical part there will be more than 2 jurisdictions, but we stick with two here for simplicity.
Generalizing to N ≥ 2 is straightforward but tedious.
3infrastructure is complementary to private capital and skilled labor so that fkp,fhp > 0,
and that fkk + fkh,fhh + fkh ≤ 0.4
There is a unit tax on capital at rate t, which is used to ﬁnance the public input and two
public consumption goods, one beneﬁtting skilled labor, gH, and one beneﬁtting unskilled
labor, gL. For example, one might think of theaters or opera houses which primarily
beneﬁt the upper classes versus housing assistance or social assistance to the poor. The
basic argument would not be changed if jurisdictions could also tax labor, provided that
skilled and unskilled labor are taxed at the same rate (Borck, 2005).
An individual with skill level j ∈ {H,L} who lives in jurisdiction i ∈ {1,2} has a




i), where x is private consumption. Each individual is
assumed to inelastically supply one unit of labor. Individuals receive income from wages
and from their capital endowment, ¯ ki, which is the same for each individual. Therefore,
the budget constraints of a skilled and unskilled individual can be written:
x
H
i = wi + r¯ ki (1)
x
L
i = f(ki,pi,hi) − (r + ti)ki − wihi + r¯ ki, (2)
where wi is the skilled wage in jurisdiction i.





i = tiki. (3)
Firms are assumed to maximize proﬁts under perfect competition. Capital and skilled
labor are mobile between regions, which implies that in equilibrium, the net return to
capital, and the utility (not necessarily the net wage) of skilled workers must be equalized
across jurisdictions. This implies:










fh(k1,p1,h1) = w1 (6)
fh(k2,p2,h2) = w2, (7)
with k1 + k2 = ¯ k1 + ¯ k2 (8)
h1 + h2 = ¯ h1 + ¯ h2, (9)
4See also Keen and Marchand (1997). These assumption imply that the capital-skilled labor ratio is
non-increasing in the rental rate of capital and non-decreasing in the skilled wage.
4where ¯ hi is the initial population of skilled workers in jurisdiction i. Equation (4) is the
location equilibrium condition for capital, and (5) the corresponding condition for skilled
labor. Note that since skilled labor receives utility from public goods, this condition will
not in general imply that the net return to labor is equalized across jurisdictions. (8)
and (9) ensure that in equilibrium, all mobile factor suppliers are located in one of the
jurisdictions.
Equations (4) – (9) determine the endogenous variables, ki,hi,wi,r for i = 1,2, as
functions of tax rates, ti and spending levels, gH









































CSC implies that increases in the capital tax rate in a jurisdiction drive out capital and
skilled labor. Further, increasing public goods beneﬁtting skilled labor will attract both
capital and skilled labor; spending on public inputs also attracts capital and may attract
skilled labor.6 The eﬀects on factor prices are generally ambiguous, but we can show that
the return to capital decreases with the capital tax rate, the high skilled wage falls and the
low skilled wage rises with gH (see the Appendix).

















i − pi,f − (r + ti)ki − wihi + r¯ ki)
5See the Appendix.
6In fact this holds in a symmetric equilibrium; see Appendix.



















































































i) for j = H,L,i = 1,2.
Equations (13)– (15) deﬁne jurisdiction 1’s reaction functions:
q1 = f(q2), (16)
where q ≡ (gH,gL,p). Diﬀerentiating gives the slopes of the reaction functions, i.e., the
response of the diﬀerent spending categories in i to changes of all spending categories
in j. It is easily seen that the theory gives no restrictions on the signs of the reaction
functions. This comes as no surprise, since the simpler models of tax competition with
only one tax rate and one public good also do not provide restrictions on the slope of the
reaction function (e.g. Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). Therefore, we will estimate reaction
functions empirically to get a sense of the signs and signiﬁcance of parameters.
This discussion is of some relevance for a number of reasons. First, the empirical litera-
ture on ﬁscal competition has focussed almost exclusively on the tax side, and if spending
is analyzed it is usually aggregate spending, with the notable exception of Case et al.
(1993) who analyze diﬀerent spending categories. Second, politically, it is of some inter-
est to know whether there is strategic interaction and in what direction it goes. Suppose
for instance the central government wants to provide incentives to local governments by
providing grants to increase spending on some public good. As is well known from the
literature on oligopoly, the comparative statics depend on whether strategic variables are
complements or substitutes. Therefore, if strategic interaction exists, knowing the slopes
of reaction functions is an important issue.8
7The ﬁrst order conditions for jurisdiction 2 are analogous.
8In a sense, for policy predictions, it would be enough to estimate a reduced form, i.e. regress spending
on exogenous variables, since in the end, this is what the policymaker is interested in. However, this would
blur the mechanism through which spending is aﬀected by exogenous variables. And moreover, it might be
potentially misleading, if for some reason the slopes of the reaction functions changed and the policymaker
still used the “old” slopes for prediction.
63 Estimation
We now want to estimate reaction functions as characterized by (16) based on a cross
section of German jurisdictions. Before describing our dataset in the next section, we set
out the empirical model used to estimate the reaction functions.
The hypothesized shape of the reaction function for spending category k = 1,...,K of
jurisdiction i will be:9
q
k





j + i, (17)
where β and λ are parameters to be estimated, x is a vector of control variables,  is an
error term, and the wij’s are weights to be used in the estimation. These weights are based
on geographical contiguity (with row-standardized elements wij = 1/ni for each of the ni
neighboring jurisdictions and wij = 0 otherwise).10
Two main issues have to be addressed when estimating (17): endogeneity of the qjs
and possible spatial error dependence. To make things clear, let us rewrite the system of
equations in (17) as
q = xβ + λWq + . (18)
Clearly, q on the RHS of (18) is endogenous, since the dependent variable in each cross-
sectional unit depends on a weighted average of that dependent variable in neighbouring
cross-sectional units. Solving (18) for the equilibrium values of the qi yields
q = (I − λW)
−1xβ + (I − λW)
−1 (19)
which shows that each element of x depends on all the  Brueckner (2003). The spatially
lagged dependent variable in (17) is then correlated with the disturbance term leading to
inconsistency of the ordinary least squares estimator (see e.g. Anselin (1988)).
Additional problems arise if the disturbance term is assumed to be spatially autore-
gressive, i.e.:
 = ρM + ξ, (20)
9We assume for the moment that jurisdiction i reacts to changes in category l by its neighbors only by
adjusting spending on its category l, not by changing other categories k 6= l.
10See Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) for a discussion and comparison of weighting schemes in the
estimation of property tax competition.
7where M is a weighting matrix which we take to be the same as our weighting matrix W,
ρ is a parameter to be estimated and ξ is a well-behaved error term. Solving (20) yields
 = (I − ρM)
−1ξ (21)
which shows that each element of  is a linear combination of the elements of ξ, implying
that i is correlated with j for i 6= j. Ignoring spatial error dependence may lead to false
evidence of strategic interaction when estimating (17). Hence we seek an estimator that is
able to deal with both sources of spatial correlation.
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest a computationally simple three-step procedure to
estimate models with spatially lagged dependent variables and spatially autoregressive
disturbances based on a set of instruments H. They refer to their estimation procedure
as a generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) procedure and we will use this
approach for the following analysis.
The basic idea is to use the instruments H in a ﬁrst step to estimate equation (18) by
2SLS, where H consists of the linearly independent columns of (X,WX,W 2X). In a second
step, the residuals obtained via the ﬁrst step are used in a ‘generalized moments’ procedure
suggested in Kelejian and Prucha (1999) to estimate the autoregressive parameter ρ. And
ﬁnally, (18) is reestimated by 2SLS after transforming the model via a Cochrane-Orcutt
type transformation to account for spatial correlation:
q∗ = x∗β + λWq∗ + , (22)
where q∗ = q − ˜ ρWq, x∗ = x − ˜ ρWx, and ˜ ρ is the estimate of ρ from the second step.
Before presenting our estimation results, we describe the dataset used for the analysis
in the next section.
4 Data
We test our model using a cross section of German communities in 2002. There are about
13,000 communities in Germany, which are further grouped into 439 counties (Landkreise)
and 16 states (L¨ ander). We use the counties as unit of analysis; excluding the four counties
belonging to city states we are left with a sample of 435. The communities receive revenues
from shared tax sources and intergovernmental grants, as well as levying their own taxes,
mainly a business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and a property tax (Grundsteuer). Communities
8are granted the right of self administration by the Constitution, but their spending rights
are limited by national and state laws. Large parts of the local budgets are devoted
to mandated expenditures. For some spending categories such as social assistance, the
communities basically just execute federal law. For others such as ﬁre departments or
sewerage, the communities have to maintain these functions but have some autonomy over
spending levels. Still other categories are discretionary spending, for instance culture and
recreational spending. In sum, while local spending autonomy is limited by higher level
government intervention, there remains a part of the budget over which the communities
have discretion. Hence, we can test for strategic interaction in the discretionary part of
local spending.




4. Science, research and culture
5. Social security
6. Health, sports and recreation
7. Construction and housing, transport
8. Public facilities, business development
9. Business enterprises, general property and special assets.
As independent variables, we use a number of typical covariates used in empirical
analyses of government spending: GDP per capita, population density, population aged
65 or older, population aged 15 or younger, rate of unemployment, and grants from higher
levels of government. We also include dummy variables for the 16 German ‘states’ (L¨ ander)
and dummies for the ‘type’ of county. There are 9 types in total, ranging from low density
rural counties to core cities. Variables and summary statistics are displayed in table 1.
9Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Population (in 1,000) 176.4464 136.2434
Population Density (Population per km2) 492.554 627.9325
Foreigners 6.90069 4.733153
Social Beneﬁt Recipients 28.14 15.01925
Employed 50.68506 16.43446
Unemployed 10.78115 5.396347
Share of Young People (< 15 years) .1494784 .0241092




Core cities in agglomerated regions .091954 .2892937
Very dense counties in agglomerated regions .1011494 .3018737
Dense counties in agglomerated regions .0896552 .286016
Rural counties in agglomerated regions .0528736 .2240387
Core cities in urbanized regions .0643678 .2456896
Dense counties in urbanized regions .2091954 .4072025
Rural counties in urbanized regions .1563218 .3635783
Rural counties of high density .1356322 .3427918
Rural counties of low density .0988506 .2988049
Per capita spending on
General administration 87.63505 40.01528
Public safety 43.42436 34.24638
Schools 72.89925 48.30317
Science, research, culture 39.56552 41.75963
Social security 182.34 177.0251
Health, sports, recreation 49.72569 37.44332
Construction, housing, transport 137.322 58.43769
Public facilities, Business development 120.9564 69.47166
Business enterprises, property and special assets 63.8963 56.57922
Total 1227.3 583.3251
N=435 observations. a See http://www.bbr.bund.de for an exact deﬁnition.
10Table 2: Spatial 2SLS results
Variable λ Std. Error ρ
Aggregate Expenditure .222 .093∗ -.319
General administration .540 .113∗∗ -.430
Public safety .059 .102 -.143
Schools .273 .116∗ -.217
Science, research, culture -.573 .118∗∗ .117
Social security -.146 .087† -.117
Health, sports, recreation .047 .167 -.098
Constr. Hous. .230 .113∗ -.098
Business development .641 .121∗∗ -.516
Business enterprises .468 .149∗∗ -.287
N=435 in all regressions.
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%, † signiﬁcant at 10%.
Estimations are based on the GS2SLS procedure by Kele-
jian and Prucha (1998). Additional explanatory variables
included as summarised in table 1.
5 Results
Results from our spatial two-stage least squares regressions are displayed in Table 2. We
follow Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and estimate the model by the GS2SLS described in
section 3. To economize on space, we only present the coeﬃcients on the spatial lag λ and
the spatial error ρ.11
First of all we want to know if there is a reaction between neighbouring counties in
total spending. As can be seen from the table, the λ for aggregate expenditure is 0.222
and statistically signiﬁcant. That means that a one Euro increase in neighbours’ spending
leads to a 0.22 Euro increase in own county spending. Hence, this conﬁrms the general
hypothesis of strategic interaction between counties. However, as theory suggests that the
reaction functions diﬀer for diﬀerent spending categories, we have also estimated the model
for the nine spending categories mentioned above.
Apart for spending on public safety and health, sports and recreation, we ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant λs for all other categories. What seems to be of particular interest are the coeﬃcients
for public facilities/business development and science, culture and research. While we
ﬁnd a strong positive reaction for the ﬁrst category (0.641), the coeﬃcient for the second
11Full estimation results are available on request.
11category is signiﬁcantly negative (−0.573). The positive reaction for public facilities and
business development indicates that there is competition between counties to attract cap-
ital, i.e. if neighbouring counties expand their spending on, e.g., sewage or waste disposal,
there is a strong incentive to do the same in order to stay competitive. The contrary is
true for spending on science and culture. While our theory did not exclude negatively
sloped reaction functions, another possibility is that any positive incentive to match other
communities’ spending is swamped by spill-overs from investment of neighbouring counties
e.g. in theatres.12 Since the regional distance between counties in Germany is in general
not very large, inhabitants of one county will in general have access to the amenities of
neighbouring counties.
Spending on infrastructure such as construction, housing and transport is typically also
seen as a category where counties compete with each other. Thus we would expect strategic
interaction here, too, and indeed we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (λ = 0.230).
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients for the categories general administration
and schools. For schools, communities have limited discretion over spending levels, since
education in Germany is a state aﬀair. However, communities have original competencies,
for instance in maintenance and extra-curricular activities. Hence, given that we control
for common state trends through dummies and for spatial error dependence, the results
may indicate strategic interaction even in this highly regulated category.
Finally, we ﬁnd a negative relation for expenditure on social security (−0.146), which is,
however, signiﬁcant at 10 % only. Here too, while the largest spending item, namely social
assistance (Sozialhilfe), is regulated by national law, communities do have some discretion
in other areas such as assistance to youths and the support of local welfare organizations.
Overall, the results show that there is signiﬁcant interaction between spending of neigh-
bouring counties in Germany. This is not only true for aggregate expenditure but also
for most of the analysed sub-categories. As some of the previous literature we also ﬁnd
positively reaction functions for most spending items, except for social security and sci-
ence/research and culture. While a variety of explanations is possible for these results, the
negative coeﬃcients are compatible with our theory; another explanation might, however,
be the existence of spillovers.
12In spillover models too, reaction functions may slope either up or down. Indeed Case et al. (1993) ﬁnd
positively sloped reaction functions for state spending in the US and interpret this in a spillover framework.
126 Conclusion
We have presented a general framework of strategic interaction of governments in diﬀerent
spending categories. Using a cross-section of German counties from 2002, we empirically
estimate reaction functions at the county level. Thereby we explicitly allow for a spatially
lagged dependent variable and a possible spatial error dependence by applying a generalized
spatial tow-stage least squares (GS2SLS) procedure. We start by estimating the reaction
function for aggregate expenditures and ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive relation
of 0.22. That mean, that a one Euro increase in neighbours’ spending leads to a 0.22
Euro increase in own county spending. However, as theory suggests that the reaction
functions diﬀer for diﬀerent spending categories, we have also estimated the model for
several spending categories, e.g. public safety, schools or social security. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
interaction in almost all spending sub-categories as well. This is consistent with the idea
that local governments use spending to attract mobile factors of production.
It is interesting to note that we ﬁnd these signiﬁcant eﬀects despite the fact that the
German local government sector is highly regulated by state and national law. However,
some discretion remains at the community level and communities seem to use this discre-
tion.
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The sign restrictions in (10) – (12) then follow from the assumptions and the fact that
dz2/dθ = −dz1/dθ for z = h,k and θ = t,gH,p.
References
Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Kluwer, Boston.
Bergstr¨ om, V. and Panas, E. E. (1992). How robust is the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis? Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, 540–546.
Borck, R. (2005). Capital skill complementarity, ﬁscal competition and the composition of
public spending. FinanzArchiv. forthcoming.
Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empir-
ical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26, 175–188.
Brueckner, J. K. and Saavedra, L. A. (2001). Do local governments engage in strategic
property-tax competition. National Tax Journal, LIV(2), 203–229.
Case, A. C., Rosen, H. S., and Hines, Jr., J. R. (1993). Budget spillovers and ﬁscal policy
interdependence: Evidence from the states. Journal of Public Economics, 52, 280–296.
Giannetti, M. (2001). Skill complementarities and migration decisions. Labour, 15, 1–32.
Griliches, Z. (1969). Capital-skill complementarity. Review of Economics and Statistics,
51(4), 465–68.
Huber, B. (1999). Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model.
Journal of Public Economics, 71(3), 441–58.
Hunt, J. (2000). Why do people still live in East Germany? NBER Working Paper 7564.
16Keen, M. and Marchand, M. (1997). Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending.
Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33–53.
Kelejian, H. and Prucha, I. (1998). A generalized spatial two-stage least squares prcoedure
for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17:1, 99–121.
Kelejian, H. and Prucha, I. (1999). A generalized moments estimator for the autoregressive
parameter in a spatial model. International Economic Review, 40, 509–533.
Krusell, P., Ohanian, L. E., R` ıos-Rull, J. V., and Violante, G. L. (2000). Capital-skill
complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica, 68, 1029–
1053.
Mauro, P. and Spilimbergo, A. (1999). How do the skilled and the unskilled respond to
regional shocks? The case of Spain. IMF Staﬀ Papers, 46(1), 1–17.
Wildasin, D. E. (1988). Nash equilibria in models of ﬁscal competition. Journal of Public
Economics, 35, 229–240.
Wilson, J. D. (1999). Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, 52, 269–304.
Zodrow, G. R. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and the
under-provision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356–370.
17